The escalation of a brutal government crackdown in Syria has elicited the first words of condemnation from the Arab League. But in the short term at least, there is little prospect of international action to limit the Assad regime's violence.
Now firmly in its fifth month of anti-government protests and counting, Syria’s future hangs in the balance. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia, or even Libya, where international forces, populations and armies mobilized in one direction, no such clear-cut alternative has emerged in Syria. This uncertainty has boxed both sides into a corner, allowing President Bashar al-Assad to pledge reforms but enact few, and pushing the Syrian opposition to bicker over its quest to offer a viable solution. With Syrians unable to keep their house in order and the sectarian question serving as warning to tread carefully, the international community has also largely sat on the fence, waiting for an as-yet elusive game changer. However, in the surrounding climate of insecurity, the ongoing stalemate is the only thing more terrifying than the crackdown, for as the ultra-realist Henry Kissinger once warned, “If you don’t know where you are going, every road will get you nowhere.”
Certainly the regime’s conversion, if it can be credited at all, came too slowly. Proponents of “Assad the reformer” have been silenced, while his promises to hold “national dialogue” and conduct media and electoral reforms have failed to appease protesters, who seem undeterred by mass arrests and a rising death toll—now said to have exceeded 2,000.
Unlike the 1980s when the West courted Eastern Europe and promised to invest in the transition from communist rule, complimenting the perestroika policies of the Gorbachev government, no such willpower exists here.
Over the past 30 years the proportion of Syrians living under the poverty line has risen from 20 to 33 percent, while 70 percent of national wealth has accumulated in the hands of a third of its citizens. The predominantly Sunni opposition movement was spawned out of the subsequent sense of injustice and rose to counter the cronyism of the ruling Alawite clique, which has grown rich without distributing wealth or creating jobs. While the fundamentally economic nature of the protests offered Assad a window to enact major changes in March, he wasted the opportunity by using bullets to crush malcontent.
A growing chorus now insists irreparable damage has been done to the Syrian social fabric. The silence in one of the world’s most repressive states has been broken and regime opponents insist that to stay in power Assad will have to kill or arrest the relatives of all those already murdered or detained. The regime has lost its claim to speak for the Syrian nation or Arab nationalism, out of which it was born. In the increasingly polarized society no road taken by Assad—short of resignation—can provide changes needed to quell dissent, which is escalating as the economy continues to free-fall.
But while the loss of moral and economic legitimacy may make his rule untenable in the long run, in the short term, the outcome is uncertain.
Even in Syria where tens of thousands of protesters have manifested on the nation’s streets for months, the movement has failed to register the same force seen in Egypt. It has limited itself mainly to Fridays and allowed a semblance of normality to remain; an initial trend illustrated by the oscillating number of refugees fleeing into Lebanon only to return days later.
Since the start of the revolution most commentators have agreed that the regime will only fall if protests reach the capital, but unlike Tunisia, Egypt or Yemen, troubles have largely bypassed Damascus.
The reasons for this are many. The ruling family continues to command support based around their minority Alawite sect, which has fuelled sectarian divisions by filling the ranks of the death squads, but also encompassing the Christian minority, which while remaining silent has prospered under secular rule. Nor can the Sunnis be represented as a homogenous block. Far too many potential reformers have deserted the cause—including comedian and satirist Dureid Lahham a former UNICEF goodwill ambassador, who has taken to the airwaves to endorse the army’s role as protector of the president, not the country.
The nebulous nature of the opposition must bear the brunt of the criticism. Few doubt that the inexperienced group of idealists, sitting abroad and fraternizing with reporters, is masking the religious and ethnic currents of the grassroots movement. Right or wrong, there is no denying that populism in this region arouses concerns among even the staunchest democrats. Without a united front, transitional platform, or backing from the military or elite, a future guided by Assad’s opponents is equally as bleak. Too real are the scars of Iraq and the presence of more than a million refugees, who took shelter in Syria as their homeland burned.
Given the impasse, some form of international intervention may provide the only alternative as foreign powers could offer a cloak of respectability needed for elites, such as ambassadors, to change allegiances. The withdrawal of the Saudi diplomatic mission in mid-August has been only the latest diplomatic setback for the regime, which has suffered staunch criticism from Turkey and been labeled “replaceable” by the US.
However, the meekness of this reaction, issued after an attack on the US Embassy by Assad loyalists, symbolizes the noncommittal nature of the international community. Unlike the 1980s when the West courted Eastern Europe and promised to invest in the transition from communist rule, complimenting the perestroika policies of the Gorbachev government, no such willpower exists here. The appetite and funds for state building have been depleted by Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, while the concept of allowing Syria’s neighbors to chaperone the revolution is also unpalatable in a region embroiled in a period of major transition.
Although few want Assad to stay in power, the preferred option is to wait. The longer the situation is allowed to fester, however, the more the moral authority of all sides will be eroded and the harder change will be. Instead of swinging one way or another, indecision threatens to splinter both camps into unrecognizable and highly unstable entities that promise to explode, Iraq style.